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5 
armers and policymakers alike are express- 
ing concern over the possible future direc-  - 
tion of  American agriculture. Prompting these 
concerns  are the rapid  changes  that  have oc- 
curred  in  production  and  marketing  patterns 
as a result  of technological improvements and 
certain  institutional  factors. In  short,  agricul- 
ture has evolved to the point where fewer, but 
larger, farms are producing most of the output 
and realizing the largest share of income. More- 
over, many agribusiness firms are exerting pres- 
sure  to more  closely  coordinate  various  pro- 
duction  and  marketing activities through con- 
tractual arrangements with  producers.  In  fact, 
several commodities such as broilers, eggs, and 
most fruits and vegetables are presently handled 
in  this  fashion  rather  than  through  an  open, 
competitive market. 
In an earlier article, the agricultural sector 
of  the  economy  was  examined  to  determine 
the  extent  to  which  economic  concentration 
has occurred in  the production and  marketing 
of  farm commodities.'  Although  the evidence 
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in that article showed that production is clearly 
becoming  more concentrated  in  the hands of 
large producers, the fact remains that economic 
power  in  agriculture  is  relatively  diffused  as 
compared with  many  industrial  sectors  of  the 
economy. Furthermore, despite well publicized 
developments  regarding  contractual  arrange- 
ments  for  a  few  commodities,  more  than 
three-fourths  of  total  farm  output  continues 
to  move  through  an  open  market  of  many 
buyers  and  sellers.  While  significant  changes 
in marketing practices may occur for individual 
commodities,  it  is generally expected  that the 
bulk  of  farm  marketings  will  be exchanged in 
open markets in the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless,  a  crucial  issue  for  farmers, 
agribusinessmen, and consumers is the organi- 
zation and control of agriculture in  the future. 
In a dispersed  system consisting of  many pro- 
prietary  units,  control  would  rest  in  the 
hands  of  many  individual  decisionmakers;  at 
the  opposite  extreme,  control  would  be  con- 
centrated in  a relatively small number of very 
large  firms,  greatly  reducing  the  high  degree 
of  individual  freedom afforded  by  a dispersed 
system. 
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The family farm-open market system that is 
so prevalent in agriculture today is a reflection 
of the stance taken by public policymakers since 
the  early  days  of  the  United  States. Shortly 
after the nation  was  founded,  it  was  decided 
that the public  interest  would  best  be  served 
by encouraging wide distribution of land owner- 
ship.  Thus,  laws  were  passed  that  facilitated 
the sale and homesteading of  public land into 
family-sized units. Similarly, the open, competi- 
tive market is a derivative of the free enterprise 
system  that  has  been  espoused  in  this  nation 
for  so  many  years.  Reflecting  the cherished 
concepts  of  freedom  and  equal  opportunity, 
early  policymakers  established  various  rules 
and  regulations  that  heavily  influenced  the 
development  of free markets in  which each  in- 
dividual could compete to earn his just reward. 
Obviously,  political  philosophies  and  social 
goals have changed as the economy has evolved 
from an agrarian to a highly complex industrial 
structure. But the markets for agricultural prod- 
ucts, some of  which  remain open  while others 
are administered, still mirror the laws, customs, 
and  institutions  that  have  been  supported  by 
public  policy.  Hence, just  as public policy has 
contributed to current agricultural production 
and marketing practices, so too will policy in- 
fluence  the  future  direction  and  control  of 
American agriculture. 
CONTROL AND THE PRESSURES  fFOR CHANGE 
Unless significant changes in  public policy 
occur, the forces affecting agricultural  produc- 
tion and marketing trends are not likely to sub- 
side in the near future. Thus, farm numbers will 
continue  to  decline,  production  will  become 
more concentrated, and further progress likely 
will  be, made in  coordinating production  and 
marketing  activities  through  contractual  ar- 
rang
e
ments. On the other  hand, public  policy 
can  be a tool with  which to counteract or re- 
direct  structural  developments  in  agriculture. 
Before this can occur, however, a general under- 
standing of  the factors which have contributed 
to structural change in  agriculture is required. 
Market Developments and Pricing 
Among  those  factors  which  have  contrib- 
uted  to the shift from  a  dispersed agriculture 
to a  more concentrated structure are the  in- 
creased  technical  complexity  of  farming  and 
the pressures to expand output to achieve lower 
unit  costs.  Technological  developments  have 
made it  possible  for  farmers to improve  pro- 
duction efficiency, but the sharp increase in the 
managerial  skills  required  of  farm  decision- 
makers has  made it  more difficult  to operate 
successfully  in  a  competitive  agricultural  en- 
vironment.  Moreover,  in  recent  years,  the 
capital requirements associated with the adop- 
tion  of  new  technology have soared, and un- 
fortunately,  many  farmers  could  not  afford 
the  investment.  While  the  staying  power  of 
smaller, less technologically  advanced, farmers 
is  surprisingly  strong,  the  price-cost  squeeze 
has  forced  many  to seek  new  jobs,  retire, or 
live on very low incomes. 
The  increased  complexity  in  agricultural 
production and the attendant risks and financial 
requirements have led to greater specialization. 
Farmers frequently focus on one or two princi- 
pal commodities in  order to exploit the econo- 
mies of volume production. Moreover, in those 
areas where they feel deficient, farmers increas- 
ingly  are turning to outside specialists for the 
technical knowledge and financing required to 
operate efficiently. Sometimes it is even neces- 
sary to enter into formal contracts to secure the 
desired services,  and  when  this happens, con- 
trol often shifts from the farmer to the outside 
interests. 
With few exceptions, however, most of these 
developments represent adjustments that would 
normally  occur  in  a  free,  competitive  market 
whenever  new  technology  is  introduced.  As 
such, the role of public policy in this case should 
be  to permit  the forces  in  motion  to operate 
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freely  unless other problems become apparent 
and are accorded higher priority. 
The manner in which farm markets function 
must  also  be examined  to explain  the current 
structure of  agriculture. The competitive mar- 
ket, as a socio-economic institution, has several 
inherent features that are desirable from a pub- 
lic  policy standpoint. Offering an environment 
in  which  no single participant can affect price, 
the market  brings together  the disparate deci- 
sions  of  buyers,  sellers,  producers,  and  con- 
sumers to establish equitable market values on 
goods and services. In addition to guiding and 
directing  production  and  consumption  deci- 
sions,  a  competitive  market  affords  a  wide 
range of individual  freedom in  that it provides 
meaningful  choices among alternatives and ef- 
fectively limits barriers to entry or exit. 
The performance of  a  pricing  system  in  a 
competitive market can be evaluated in terms of 
how  well  it  satisfies certain  specified  criteria. 
As far as agriculture is concerned, an effective 
pricing system is expected to facilitate the phys- 
ical marketing of the commodity, yield accept- 
able  returns to market  participants, maintain 
reasonably  stable  prices,  protect  long-run  de- 
mand  by  not  pricing  the  product  out  of  the 
market, assure equitable treatment of all partic- 
ipants, and clear the market.* 
Most of  the problems with  pricing systems 
in  agriculture  revolve  around  the  first  three 
criteria. Probably the most important factor be- 
hind the decline of traditional open markets has 
been the growing inefficiency in physically mov- 
ing and exchanging commodities. Direct selling, 
either through individual negotiation or formula 
pricing, as well as vertical integration have pro- 
vided  much  greater  efficiencies in  assembling 
and handling several farm commodities.  Con- 
sequently, the open  market is often skirted al- 
together, coming into  play  only as a base for 
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determining  the "going  price" in  the negotia- 
tions.  Obviously,  if  the  central  market  slips 
in  volume  of  sales,  a  question  immediately 
arises  about  the validity  of  the reported  base 
price as a signal of general  market conditions 
for the industry as a whole. Where this problem 
has occurred, participants in the exchange must 
often depend upon their own abilities to acquire 
and translate general market news into a price. 
Farmer  dissatisfaction  with  open  market 
results,  perceived as not  yielding equitable re- 
turns to market participants, represents another 
threat to the structural organization of agricul- 
ture.  History  provides  several  examples  of 
farmers seeking out alternative pricing systems 
to  gain  better  treatment.  Owing  to  unstable 
prices, chaotic conditions, and inefficient hand- 
ling,  farm legislation  established Federal  mar- 
keting orders for fluid milk during the 1930's to 
instill greater stability and order in the industry. 
Virtually all of the selling is now done directly 
to the processor  under a tight set of specifica- 
tions. Consequently, milk prices are some of the 
most stable in  agriculture today, thus satisfying 
the  third  criterion  for  successful  performance 
of a pricing system; however, the markets do re- 
quire close supervision under this arrangement. 
In  essence,  the existence  of  marketing or- 
ders, formula  pricing  techniques,  and  vertical 
integration  reflect  not only the special charac- 
teristics of  the commodities involved but also 
certain  shortcomings  of  the market as viewed 
by  the   participant^.^  While  these  alternative 
pricing systems have produced positive benefits 
for certain  farmers, the results in  other areas 
have been  disappointing. For example, vertical 
integration  in  the broiler  industry  has  trans- 
formed most producers into piece-wage workers 
and, at the same time, has virtually eliminated 
the market. In fact, quotations on farm prices 
for  broilers  no  longer  exist.  Although  con- 
sumers  and  some  producers  stand  to  benefit 
3/The  characteristics  of commodities  typically  produced  under 
contract or by vertically integrated industries were discussed by  the 
authors in the article cited in footnote I. 
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from greater price stability and more efficient 
production,  certain costs  as measured  by  the 
constraints placed  on  farmers in  making pro- 
duction  decisions  and  controlling  marketings 
must be taken into consideration before a final 
judgment is made on a new marketing arrange- 
ment. Public policy can play an integral role in 
cultivating  the changes that are needed in the 
future while correcting  for errors made in  the 
past. 
Institutional Factors 
Previous research suggests that the increase 
in  economic concentration  in  agriculture has 
also  been  influenced  by  several  institutional 
factors. Government farm programs, for exam- 
ple, have probably given an unintended boost to 
larger farms even though various direct actions 
have been taken to support the smaller family 
units. According to one report, several  impor- 
tant reasons for believing that price and income 
programs speed the trend to concentrated hold- 
ings are(1) wealthy investors, either farm or off- 
farm, presumably are highly responsive to pro- 
tected income, (2) the stability of income prom- 
ised  by  programs  may  provide improved  ac- 
cess to big capital markets, and (3) small farm- 
ers probably have more difficulty accumulating 
capital  for  expansion  even  with  commodity 
support   program^.^  Although  it  is  difficult  to 
specify  the extent  to which  government  pro- 
grams  have  contributed  to economic  concen- 
tration in  agriculture,  the  overall  impact  has 
been  to help finance  growth  to larger opera- 
tions that might  not  have occurred otherwise. 
Income  tax  laws  have  also  introduced  an 
institutional bias that has accelerated the trend 
toward  larger  farms.  According  to  Professor 
Levi, three features in the tax laws give prefer- 
ential  advantages  to  wealthy  taxpayers  who 
make investments  in  agriculture even  though 
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the system presumably is progressive in nat~re.~ 
For  example,  the  graduation  of  income  tax 
rates, the special rates for income from capital 
gains, and  the treatment  of depreciation  as a 
"paper loss" all work to the relative advantage 
of  people in  high  tax brackets because,  in  es- 
sence, a larger proportion of the investment ul- 
timately is subsidized by the Treasury. Meisner 
and  Rhodes  recently  examined  the  changing 
structure of  the cattle feeding industry, giving 
special attention to the rapid influx of outside 
investors who have found cattle feeding to be an 
attractive  tax  ~helter.~  For  this  reason  and 
others, cattle feeding in  large commercial lots 
expanded sharply during the 1960's. Moreover, 
as outside investment funds continued to roll in 
during the early  1970's, the industry expanded 
further  even  though  the  returns,  without  tax 
considerations, may not have warranted it. Cer- 
tainly,  part  of  the crisis  now  confronting  the 
cattle  feeding  industry-not  to  mention  its 
concentrated  structure--is  traceable  to  the 
response of outside investors to attractive con- 
cessions in the tax laws. 
Aside  from  the obvious  loss of  revenue  to 
the  Treasury,  tax-subsidized  investments  in 
agriculture have several other effects, not all of 
which  are desirable. It is widely accepted that 
tax concessions tend to bring more risk capital 
into  farming,  especially  for  large scale  enter- 
prises such  as cattle feeding,  poultry,  and or- 
chards. They also have the effect of expanding 
production,  thus lowering  farm prices and in- 
comes in  most cases. Furthermore, because the 
concessions  make it  possible  for  the tax-sub- 
sidized investor to make money even though the 
enterprise  itself  shows  no  profit,  ownership 
and  control  are frequently  shifted  out  of  the 
hands of farmers who may find it difficult, if not 
5JDonald R. Levi, "Federal Income Tax Law-A Powerful Policy 
Tool," Economic  and  Marketing Informalion  for  Missouri  Agri- 
culture,  Department  of  Agricultural  Economics,  University  of 
Missouri-Columbia, Vol. 19, No.  7, (July 1971). 
615. C. Meisner and V. James Rhodes, "The Changing Structure 
of U.S. Cattle Feeding," Department of Agricultural  Economics, 
University  of  Missouri-Columbia,  Special  Report  167,  Novem- 
ber 1974. 
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impossible,  to compete under these conditions. 
Clearly, the tax rules do affect structural devel- 
opments in agriculture and the ability to com- 
pete for  resource ownership. Preserving  a dis- 
persed  agriculture  will  likely  require,  among 
other things, a fundamental  reappraisal of  the 
tax system by  policymakers with a view toward 
reform in certain areas. 
~aintainin~  Control 
Assuming that managerial skills are not a 
limiting factor, the key  to whether agriculture 
remains dispersed or becomes more concentrat- 
ed is control. If control is to rest in the hands of 
the  traditional  farmer,  certain  conditions  re- 
garding  access  to markets  and  to 'important 
resources, such  as land,  technical  knowledge, 
and credit, must prevail. 
With  respect  to farmland,  various  policies 
in  the past  have  been  designed  to augment  a 
wide distribution  of  ownership.  However,  the 
competing demands for farmland for urbaniza- 
tion  and  recreational  purposes,  coupled  with 
new laws on zoning, conservation, and pollution 
controls,  threaten  to  restrict  this  privilege. 
Furthermore,  the upward trend in  land  prices 
has  markedly  reduced  the  opportunities  for 
many young farmers to purchase farm  real es- 
tate despite credit  policies that have generally 
favored farm ownership. 
Access to knowledge,  whether technical or 
market  related,  is  another  factor  which  can 
affect  the  structure  of  agriculture.  Even  the 
so-called "free" market  depends  on  effective 
government  regulation  and  information  to 
make it workable. Each year millions of dollars 
are spent  by  public and  private institutions to 
provide  market  participants  with  information 
on  production  estimates,  expected  disappear- 
ance, and the latest price developments in  do- 
mestic and international markets. Competitive 
marketing systems  cannot  function  effectively 
without good information. 
Equal  access  to  research  findings  from 
scientific experiments by public-supported insti- 
tutions, such as land grant universities, has en- 
abled  many  family  farm units to remain tech- 
nologically  efficient  and  competitive.  Any  re- 
strictions on access to this knowledge will give 
a special advantage to those who acquire it first. 
Thus,  a  policy  to confine  research  mainly  to 
private firms  would likely lead to greater con- 
centration  in  agriculture,  especially  if  the re- 
search  happened to focus on  product develop- 
ment  and  promotion  in  vertically  integrated 
industries. 
In  the last few  years, one of the chief con- 
cerns in agriculture has been the sharp increase 
in  capital  requirements as land values and the 
amount paid out for purchased inputs have sky- 
rocketed. Because  of  these  developments,  the 
risks in farming are such that, if prices received 
drop even modestly below costs, severe financial 
stress can result unless precautionary  measures 
are taken. Sometimes these risks can be shifted 
to others through  the  use  of  futures  markets 
or crop insurance. Price support programs and 
tax  shelters  also  offer  protection.  However, 
some producers are finding it necessary to form 
contractual  arrangements  with  processors  to 
reduce risks, which frequently  results in  some 
loss of managerial control. 
Similar  problems  exist  with  credit.  Any 
policy that makes credit more available or less 
expensive to certain groups will affect the future 
structure and control of agriculture. The tradi- 
tional  sources  of  credit,  while they  have  been 
sufficient  to  date,  could  encounter  problems 
which  may  make it  more  difficult  to finance 
agriculture at competitive rates. Many farmers 
have already boosted their borrowings to levels 
that seem precarious, given the high risks noted 
earlier. Hence, a future problem may be finding 
ways  to  increase  equity  capital  to solidify  a 
farmer's financial position. If increases in farm 
income  prove  inadequate,  outside sources  of 
equity  capital  will  probably  take on  greater 
importance. There are several ways to acquire 
outside capital, including  the sale of  common 
or  preferred stock if  the farm is incorporated, 
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but virtually all of the methods entail some loss 
of  control.  However,  if  these  measures  fall 
short, a higher incidence of  direct ties between 
producers  and  vertically  integrated  organiza- 
tions in order to  secure funds for agriculture can 
probably  be expected,  in  which  case much  of 
the control likely would shift out of  the farm- 
ers'  hands. Obviously, public policy may face a 
formidable challenge in  the future in  assuring 
that  the  growing  credit  needs  of  individual 
farmers are met within reason. 
The shift in  emphasis from marketing com- 
modities  to merchandising  food through prod- 
uct  development and promotion by  processors 
and  retailers  suggests  that  several  farm  pro- 
duction  units  will  or could  be absorbed  into 
large corporate enterprises, resulting in  a more 
concentrated  agriculture.  Thus,  maintaining 
access  to  markets  is  essential  to a  dispersed 
proprietary farming system. 
Two different  approaches  can  be  used  to 
keep marketing options open. In short, farmers 
may try to preserve access, as individuals, to an 
open market system, or they may seek  to pro- 
tect  market  access  by  grouping  together.'  In 
the group approach, certain individual preroga- 
tives  would  probably  be  relinquished,  but  for 
some commodities, individual  access  may  not 
always be attainable. 
Many farmers are examining group action 
because they  are  becoming  increasingly  con- 
cerned about the fairness of price-making forces 
in deteriorating open markets and because they 
feel at a disadvantage in individual negotiation. 
While there are various  ways in  which  group 
action  can  occur,  most  of  the  attention  has 
focused  either  on  vertical  integration  through 
farmer cooperatives or on horizontal bargaining 
associations. 
A  common  misconception  is  that the pri- 
mary  reason  for  group bargaining is  to raise 
prices above their free market level. While this 
7/Rhodes.  "Policies  Affecting  Access  to  Markets,"  Who  Will 
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objective exists, farmers may actually use bar- 
gaining just to discover a fair and stable price 
thought  to  be  absent  in  the  present  pricing 
system. 
Much of the impetus behind the cooperative 
movement has emanated from the Capper-Vol- 
stead Act of 1922 which explicitly allowed farm- 
ers  to  form  cooperative  associations  without 
fear of  violating the antitrust  laws.  But  in  no 
sense  does  Capper-Volstead  permit  farm  co- 
operatives  to  do  things  that  are  otherwise 
illegal,  such  as  monopolizing  or  restraining 
trade enough  to unduly  influence  prices.  Re- 
flecting  this  call  for  surveillance,  the Justice 
Department  has  recently  filed  civil  antitrust 
suits against  a  few  very  large  regional  dairy 
cooperatives, charging them with  illegal  prac- 
tices. Thus, there are limits to the power that 
cooperatives  can  exercise  in  behalf  of  their 
membership. 
Public policy clearly encourages the cooper- 
ative concept as a means of equalizing the bar- 
gaining  power  of  the individuals  belonging  to 
the cooperative and the large firms with which 
they  must  do  business.  As such, co-ops  have 
become quite important as a means of preserv- 
ing  the  producer's  access  to commodity  and 
input  markets.  Furthermore, farmers are able 
to gain some of the benefits of industrial organi- 
zation  without  being enveloped  into a big cor- 
porate structure. 
The bargaining association differs from the 
cooperative  in  that it  serves as the producers' 
representative in  contractual negotiations over 
prices and other terms of trade. In some cases, 
however, a cooperative may not only integrate 
forward but also serve as the bargaining agent 
for its members. At any rate, the greatest gains 
from bargaining  thus far in  the United States 
have been  mainly  in  fluid  milk and processing 
fruits  and vegetables-both  of  which  involve 
cooperative bargaining in  the establishment of 
government marketing orders. 
In essence, the overall strategy is for farmers 
to turn to group action as a replacement for the 
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open  market.  Producers  would  likely  forego 
some of their individual freedoms for the privi- 
lege  of  gaining  greater  security  and  less  risk 
through their cooperatives or bargaining asso- 
ciations. However, some hazards are involved. 
For example, when a cooperative becomes large 
enough  to compete with  strong  corporate in- 
terests,  will  it  remain  responsive  to its  mem- 
bership, or has  it  moved  beyond  the farmers' 
ability to control it?8 Clearly, when a coopera- 
tive becomes the only viable access to a market, 
the  policy  implications  are far  different  than 
when  it  represents  just  another  choice  in  an 
open market of many competing firms. Further- 
more, there is evidence that some "corporate" 
farmers are invading the Capper-Volstead shel- 
ter in order to bargain for, or "discuss,"  higher 
prices  with  each  other  and  escape  antitrust 
prosecution. One danger is that if  this practice 
becomes  widespread,  not  only  will  these cor- 
porations  lose  their  privileges  but  the  whole 
cooperative system could be placed in jeopardy. 
Moreover, if  agriculture becomes concentrated 
with  limited  marketing  opportunities,  public 
policy  would  inevitably  be  forced  to consider 
regulation  of  pricing  practices  to  protect  the 
consumer. 
lMPLOCAUlONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent 
that the agricultural sector of the economy is a 
complex amalgam of  many different organiza- 
tions and ways of doing business. The relatively 
dispersed system that has survived  in  agricul- 
ture for so long has been supported by  various 
national  policies.  The dissemination  of  infor- 
mation, an agricultural credit system, price sup- 
port programs, and the authority for farmers to 
group together for bargaining purposes are but 
a  few  of  the  measures  sanctioned  by  public 
policy.  Clearly,  organizational  structure  has 
historically  been  a  public  policy  issue,  and  it 
will no doubt continue to be. 
From the consumers' standpoint, most of the 
evidence suggests that under either a dispersed 
or  a  concentrated  agriculture,  adequate food 
supplies  would  be available. However, the im- 
plications for  prices are likely  to be quite dif- 
ferent  under the two systems. With  a concen- 
trated agriculture in which a few large, vertical- 
ly  integrated  or corporate firms  would  domi- 
nate, monopolistic pricing could easily surface 
and  offset  the  potential  gains  to  consumers 
arising  from  closer  market  coordination.  In 
this event, policymakers would find it necessary 
to police the performance of the pricing system 
very  diligently-probably  a  cumbersome  pro- 
cess-to protect the interests of the public. 
The defense  of  the  dispersed,  competitive 
market system  rests  heavily  on  its  socio-eco- 
nomic qualities of freedom and fair play as well 
as its ability  to guide and direct resource use. 
As noted, obstacles arising from the complexity 
of  many  industrial  processes,  and  problems 
associated with the control of markets in which 
merchandising techniques are emphasized, pose 
a serious threat to the dispersal concept. By  the 
same token, it  is  becoming increasingly  clear 
that  the  degree  of  freedom  in  present  farm 
operations  may  have  to  give  way  to the  re- 
quirements  of  market  coordination  for  best 
meeting the demands of a sophisticated econo- 
my. Some sacrifice in  individual  freedom may 
be in order for the common good. 
Nevertheless,  the present  structure of  agri- 
culture is very competitive with control resting 
largely  in  the  hands  of  individual  producers. 
Furthermore,  there is  still  considerable  room 
to move in  the direction of  greater concentra- 
tion  for  the sake of  efficiency  without  losing 
these  desirable  features.  Certainly,  the  com- 
petitive system-while  far from  perfect-pos- 
sesses  several  admirable  features  that  merit 
the continued  loyalty  of  policymakers.  Prob- 
ably  no  other  system  is  capable of  giving so 
much positive direction to the economy with so 
little need for policing the performance. 
If there is a danger, it is that control of agri- 
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culture may shift out of the hands of individual 
producers,  not  because  the family  farm-open 
market concept  is  an  anachronism  in  a com- 
plex industrialized economy, but because public 
policy  may  not  perceive the ultimate impact 
of  the forces in  motion until it is too late. For 
farmers  to  lose  control  by  default  would  be 
most unfortunate, but if the trends now under- 
way in agriculture continue unchecked, this may 
happen. In the final analysis, the question about 
the future direction and control of  agriculture 
can be settled in a number of ways, depending 
on how public policy views the problem. In all 
probability, the final decision will  hinge more 
on social and political viewpoints than on eco- 
nomic ones. 
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